JTBC’s report makes several key claims about Shincheonji and Mr. Ko’s actions. We will evaluate each claim for truthfulness, using available evidence such as witness testimony, documents, and other reporting:

• Claim 1: A Shincheonji executive (“#2 man”) ordered an assault on a member who questioned him.
  Verdict: Credible, with corroborating evidence. JTBC supports this claim with hard evidence – text messages and first-hand witness accountsv.daum.net. The messages (which JTBC has in its possession) explicitly discuss hiring thugs to attack the outspoken memberv.daum.net. A former bodyguard from Lee Man-hee’s security team has provided testimony confirming that Mr. Ko convened them and gave instructions to harm the targetv.daum.net. While these allegations have not yet been tested in court, the detailed nature of the evidence lends strong credibility. Importantly, Shincheonji leadership has not issued any denial or refutation of the specifics so far. JTBC noted that when they reached out to Shincheonji for comment (in this and related investigations), they received no responsev.daum.net. The silence from Shincheonji’s side, despite the gravity of the accusation, suggests that they may not have a clear counter-explanation. It’s also worth noting that soliciting violence is a crime in itself, and law enforcement could theoretically investigate this if provided the evidence. As of this report, however, there is no public indication of police action on the assault conspiracy – the story came to light through JTBC’s journalism, not a criminal case.

• Claim 2: Mr. Ko suggested using illegal foreign workers to carry out the attack.
  Verdict: Credible. The JTBC report directly quotes the content of Ko’s alleged instruction: “Hire foreigners (illegal stayers) to do it… there are many illegal immigrants among OOO”v.daum.net. This level of detail implies JTBC had either the exact message or a very clear witness recollection. While it may sound extreme, this tactic sadly has some plausibility. Using undocumented individuals as enforcers could be seen as a way to avoid tracing the crime back to the group – the perpetrators might be hard to identify or deported if caught. JTBC’s framing of this as “beyond absurd and clearly criminal” is accuratev.daum.net. There’s no official statement disputing this detail, and it aligns with the overall narrative that Ko was desperate to punish his critic while shielding himself. Given JTBC’s evidence, we have no reason to doubt that this specific “hire an illegal immigrant hitman” order was indeed given. It underscores the premeditation and brazenness of the scheme.

• Claim 3: Mr. Ko had been accused of sexual abuse and embezzlement internally since 2021.
  Verdict: True, supported by multiple sources. The article mentions that from 2021 onward, allegations of sexual assault and financial wrongdoing by Ko surfaced inside Shincheonjiv.daum.net. This is strongly corroborated by independent reporting from earlier in 2023. On March 14, 2023, a civic group of ex-Shincheonji members and families (the National Shincheonji Victims Coalition, 전국신천지피해자연대, often abbreviated “Jeonpiyeon”) held a press conference to expose Ko’s alleged sex crimesmch.nocutnews.co.krmch.nocutnews.co.kr. A former Shincheonji youth leader (Mr. Yoo) testified that Ko, as Shincheonji’s general affairs director, sexually assaulted a young female member who had been introduced to himmch.nocutnews.co.kr. According to Yoo’s statement, Ko even asked for a woman with certain physical attributes and then raped the introduced devoteemch.nocutnews.co.kr. Rather than punishing Ko, Shincheonji’s top leadership initially tried to cover up the incident: Yoo reported the rape to Chairman Lee Man-hee, who responded “I won’t let him off if that’s true”, but subsequently Yoo was transferred to a different post and other officials accused him of lying to smear the churchmch.nocutnews.co.kr. Jeonpiyeon’s representatives alleged a systematic cover-up, where Shincheonji leaders coerced and threatened the victims to stay quietmch.nocutnews.co.kr. Furthermore, in that March 2023 action, the coalition filed a police report against Mr. Ko for sexual assault, and also accused Chairman Lee and others of destroying evidence related to the casemch.nocutnews.co.kr. This demonstrates that well before JTBC’s June 2025 report, Mr. Ko’s misconduct was a serious issue: multiple women came forward, a victims’ group went public, and a legal complaint was lodged. The embezzlement part is also credible – recall that Chairman Lee Man-hee himself was convicted in early 2021 of embezzling church funds, and Ko, as a top executive, was rumored to be involved in financial irregularitiesreuters.com. In sum, JTBC’s portrayal of Ko as already scandal-ridden (sex crimes, graft) is strongly backed by prior evidence. It explains Ko’s possible motive to retaliate against whistleblowers: he was trying to silence those exposing his wrongdoings.

• Claim 4: Ko was effectively the #2 leader in Shincheonji and even ran the church during Lee’s detention.
  Verdict: True. The article calls Mr. Ko “Shincheonji’s 2인자 (second-in-command)”v.daum.net and notes he headed the organization while Chairman Lee was in jail (Lee was arrested in 2020 amid the COVID outbreak investigation). This checks out with what’s known about Shincheonji’s hierarchy. Ko’s title was “Chief General Affairs Officer of the General Assembly,” a role close to the very top. When Lee Man-hee was arrested and briefly detained in mid-2020 (he was later released on bail and eventually acquitted of the main COVID charge), someone had to mind the store. Multiple sources identify Ko as a close confidant who took charge in Lee’s absencev.daum.net. In Korean media and ex-member testimonies, Ko was often referred to with reverence as practically the “vice-captain” of Shincheonji. Thus, the individual in question had substantial authority within the sect, which makes the allegations of him orchestrating internal retribution quite plausible. It’s worth adding that Shincheonji has a very centralized, top-down structure – if the Chairman is analogous to a king or pope, a figure like Ko would be akin to a prime minister. There is no sign of exaggeration in JTBC calling Ko the No.2; in fact, Shincheonji insiders would readily agree he was once one of the most powerful figures (until his fall from grace).

• Claim 5: Shincheonji leaders often behave as if they are “above the law,” citing an illegal motorcade for Lee Man-hee.
  Verdict: True, evidenced by recent reports. As context, JTBC’s anchor commented that “nonsensical acts transcending law were frequent” inside Shincheonjiv.daum.net. This claim is supported by other JTBC investigations and historical incidents. Notably, just one day before the assault story, JTBC aired an exclusive about Chairman Lee Man-hee’s VIP-style convoy. In that June 25, 2025 report, JTBC revealed that Shincheonji ran an unauthorized “presidential-level” escort for Lee’s carv.daum.net. Ex-members testified that a special “convoy team” within Shincheonji (sometimes called the “Volunteer Traffic Unit”) used multiple black vehicles with flashing sirens to block roads and clear traffic whenever Lee traveled, ensuring “the Chairman’s car must not stop”v.daum.netv.daum.net. For example, bodyguards would physically block intersections so that Lee’s motorcade could run red lights or make U-turns without delayv.daum.net. One former guard said it looked “just like when a President is passing by”, causing ordinary drivers to think some state VIP was on the roadv.daum.net. In reality, these were private citizens illegally impersonating police escorts, complete with unauthorized siren lightsv.daum.net. This behavior blatantly violated traffic laws and inconvenienced the public, demonstrating Shincheonji’s belief that their leader deserved special treatment above ordinary rules. JTBC even obtained video of this convoy in action and reported that Shincheonji gave no answer when pressed for an explanationmk.co.kr. Additionally, looking back, Shincheonji has been implicated in other unlawful or extreme actions: for instance, Christian counter-cult activists have documented cases of violence in the 2000s, such as alleged kidnappings and group assaults of defectors who left Shincheonji or of pastors who opposed the sectkidok.com. While those earlier cases are disputed and not widely publicized, the pattern of intimidation and operating in a quasi-legal gray zone is a recurring theme. Therefore, JTBC’s suggestion that this assault plot is “one of many” outrageous happenings is credible. It paints Shincheonji’s leadership culture as one where ends justify the means, even if that means breaking the law – a characterization consistent with the evidence we have (from the COVID cover-up, to the convoy, to abuse cover-ups, etc.).

• Claim 6: Mr. Ko was expelled from Shincheonji in 2024 and the planned “terror” never took place.
  Verdict: True. JTBC reports that Ko’s power waned as his scandals grew, and by 2024 he was expelled (excommunicated) from Shincheonjiv.daum.net. Indeed, following the March 2023 public revelations of his misconduct, it appears Shincheonji leadership eventually decided to remove him to stem further damage to the church’s image. By “the following year” after the plot (which was late 2023), Ko was out. There are signs this is accurate: since late 2024, Shincheonji’s official events and communications no longer mention Ko, implying he’s persona non grata. No reports have surfaced of any attack on the whistleblower, confirming that the violent scheme was never executedv.daum.net. It’s possible that the plot fell apart either because the bodyguards hesitated or because Ko’s ouster made it moot. JTBC’s evidence also suggests the bodyguards did not ultimately carry out the order – they were discussing it, but there’s no indication of an assault happening. South Korean media has reported no such incident of a Shincheonji member being mysteriously beaten, so we can reasonably conclude the plan was foiled (perhaps internally). As of now, Mr. Ko remains a free man, not charged, and likely lying low. The claim of his expulsion is further supported by the victims’ coalition statements: after Ko’s crimes came to light, Shincheonji had strong incentives to cut ties. While Shincheonji hasn’t officially announced “We expelled Ko,” JTBC’s sourcing on this is likely from insider info, and no one has refuted it. So yes – Ko is gone from Shincheonji, and thankfully, the worst (physical harm) was avoided.

In summary, JTBC’s major claims hold up under scrutiny. The network appears to have conducted a serious investigation, gathering primary evidence and multiple testimonies. Their findings on the assault order align with known facts about Shincheonji’s internal discipline methods and the documented misconduct of the official in question. No contradictory evidence has emerged; on the contrary, other sources (ex-members, legal filings, earlier news) reinforce JTBC’s narrative. While we should note that these revelations are allegations not proven in court, the consistency and volume of evidence strongly indicate they are truthful. Shincheonji’s lack of rebuttal and Mr. Ko’s avoidance of media contact further suggest that the claims are likely accurate – if they were false, one would expect a swift denial or lawsuit from Shincheonji’s side given their litigious history. Instead, we have silence, which speaks volumes.

To fully grasp the significance of this news, it’s important to understand what Shincheonji is, who the people involved are, and the broader legal/social context of this story. This section provides that background for readers unfamiliar with Korean language or culture.

Shincheonji Church of Jesus – A Controversial Religious Sect

If the court finds Shincheonji guilty—especially if it’s confirmed that Ko Jae-hong (former General Affairs Director and known as the #2 under Chairman Lee Man-hee) ordered an assault using undocumented immigrants—it would be a serious crime under Korean law. This would fall under criminal solicitation and conspiracy to commit assault, both punishable by imprisonment. If there’s proof that higher leadership knew or covered it up, Shincheonji could face broader civil or organizational penalties, like fines or even revocation of legal status in some jurisdictions.

But here’s how Shincheonji usually does damage control:

1. Expel and disown the individual (they already removed Ko Jae-hong) to claim he acted alone.

2. Issue a vague public statement – something like “his actions do not reflect the values of Shincheonji.”

3. Internally spin the story as persecution of the righteous, with Lee Man-hee positioned as the misunderstood “Promised Pastor.”

4. Launch positive PR events (like their “100,000 graduation”) to flood the media and shift public focus.

5. Instruct members not to read outside news and label critics as enemies trying to “stop the work of God.”

It’s the same pattern we saw during COVID—deny, deflect, spiritualize, and reframe criticism as satanic persecution. Unless authorities act decisively or victims press charges, Shincheonji is likely to weather this storm by controlling the narrative both inside and out.

Shincheonji Church’s large-scale gatherings are exemplified by its “100,000 Graduation Ceremony,” where tens of thousands of new recruits fill a stadium for a mass worship servicedonga.com. Shincheonji (officially, “Shincheonji Church of Jesus, the Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony”) is a new religious movement in South Korea, founded in 1984 by Lee Man-heereligionmediacentre.org.uk. The name “Shincheonji” literally means “New Heaven and New Earth” in Korean. Shincheonji is an offshoot of Christian millennialism and is widely regarded as a cult by mainstream churches and Korean societyreligionmediacentre.org.uk.

Some key points about Shincheonji and its beliefs/operations:

• Founder Lee Man-hee: Lee, now in his early 90s, claims a special spiritual status. He is often called “the Promised Pastor” or “the Counselor” who alone can correctly interpret the Bible’s propheciesreligionmediacentre.org.uk. In fact, many Shincheonji followers believe that Lee is immortal or at least chosen by God to not die until a promised fulfillment – essentially viewing him as a living messianic figurereligionmediacentre.org.uk. Reuters described Lee as a “self-proclaimed messiah”reuters.com. This exalted view of the founder fosters intense loyalty; his words are taken as scripture within the group.

• Secretive and Deceptive Practices: Shincheonji is known for its covert evangelism tactics. Members often conceal their affiliation and infiltrate other churches or campus groups to recruit people. This has led to social friction, as unsuspecting individuals find themselves drawn into Bible studies that are actually Shincheonji-run. The church is organized into 12 Tribes, named after the 12 biblical tribes, and runs rigorous Bible courses (through the “Zion Christian Mission Center”) which all converts must complete. Members dedicate enormous time and money – tithing 10% of income, attending lengthy indoctrination classes, and sometimes cutting off ties with non-believing familyreligionmediacentre.org.uk. These behaviors are why Korean society labels Shincheonji a cult – it demands absolute devotion, uses high-pressure recruitment, and operates with near-total opacity.

• Mass Gatherings and Public Presence: Shincheonji tends to showcase its growth through huge events. For instance, in November 2022 and again in November 2023, it held “100,000 Graduation” ceremonies (like the one in Daegu World Cup Stadium) to celebrate supposedly over 100,000 new graduates of its Bible course in a yeardonga.com. These extravagant ceremonies, complete with synchronized performances and thousands in attendance, are public relations moments for Shincheonji. However, they also sparked skepticism – external critics, including Christian media (e.g., Hyundai Gospel Magazine), have questioned the numbers and noted that many “graduates” are likely already existing members filling seatshdjongkyo.co.kr. Nonetheless, such events demonstrate Shincheonji’s organizational might and the fervor of its members.

• Mainstream Outrage – COVID-19 Outbreak: Shincheonji’s most infamous moment came in early 2020. The group was at the epicenter of South Korea’s first major COVID-19 explosion. In February 2020, a Shincheonji member (“Patient 31”) infected many others at services in Daegu, leading to over 5,000 cases linked to the church. This made up 60% of South Korea’s cases at that timereligionmediacentre.org.ukreuters.com. The public was furious to learn that Shincheonji’s secrecy (they initially did not hand over complete membership lists and had worship in close quarters) hindered contact tracingreuters.com. The government accused Shincheonji of obstruction; in fact, Seoul’s mayor sued Lee Man-hee and Shincheonji leaders for “murder by negligence” and disease control law violations in March 2020english.seoul.go.kr. Lee Man-hee was arrested in July 2020 on charges of hindering the pandemic response by hiding informationreuters.com. (Authorities alleged Shincheonji withheld the full roster of attendees and church locations, which slowed the quarantine effortsreuters.comreuters.com.) This was an unprecedented clash between the state and a religious sect. Ultimately, in January 2021 the courts acquitted Lee of the COVID obstruction charge on legal technicalities, but they convicted him of embezzling ~$5 million of church funds and unauthorized use of public facilitiesreuters.com. Lee received a suspended prison sentence for the financial crimesreuters.com. The church “welcomed” his acquittal on the virus matter but had “deep regret” about the guilty verdict, insisting on his innocencereuters.com. Despite the mixed legal outcome, Shincheonji’s public reputation in Korea was severely damaged. It was seen as a dangerous, law-flouting cult: local governments even revoked Shincheonji’s corporate registration in some areas in 2020 as punishment (the Seoul City government canceled a Shincheonji-related foundation’s permit)24-7pressrelease.comkoreaherald.com. Lee Man-hee had to apologize on national TV, kneeling and bowing, for the church’s role in the outbreak – a dramatic moment in South Korea’s pandemic saga.

• Relationship with Society: Ever since, Shincheonji has been under a microscope. Families of Shincheonji members often form anti-cult groups, complaining that their loved ones are “brainwashed” and even kidnapping them for deprogramming (which is another controversial issue – some Shincheonji members became victims of forced deprogramming by pastors, leading Shincheonji to create its own “human rights” front groups). The COVID incident, however, turned even ordinary citizens against Shincheonji for a time. The sect has tried to rehabilitate its image (even volunteering en masse for plasma donation in mid-2020 to show goodwill), but distrust remains high.

In this context, JTBC’s revelations of internal violence and illegal behavior reinforce the public’s worst suspicions about Shincheonji – that it operates like a state within a state, with its own rules, willing to trample laws or rights for the sake of the “gospel” or the leader’s authority.

Understanding the two central figures – Lee Man-hee (the founder) and Mr. Ko (the disgraced lieutenant) – is crucial to see the stakes of this story.

• Lee Man-hee (Shincheonji Chairman): Now around 93 years old, Lee is the charismatic leader upon whom the entire Shincheonji doctrine hinges. He claims to be the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, essentially the human through whom Jesus works in the end times. Shincheonji teaches that the Book of Revelation has been fulfilled in metaphorical form through Lee’s ministry, and that he will lead 144,000 “sealed” believers into the Millennial Kingdom. Because of these beliefs, followers give Lee total reverence. He is often referred to as “이만희 총회장님” (Chairman Lee, with an honorific) and treated like royalty. The JTBC convoy report vividly illustrated this: Lee expected presidential treatment wherever he wentv.daum.netv.daum.net. In the image below, taken from JTBC’s coverage, Lee Man-hee is seen waving from a car window while being escorted by unofficial security vehicles, mimicking a head-of-state motorcadev.daum.net. This level of adulation shows why subordinates might go to extreme lengths to “protect” or obey leaders like Lee. Despite his advanced age and past brushes with the law, Lee Man-hee remains at the helm of Shincheonji. Internally, he likely authorized the removal of Mr. Ko once Ko became a liability. Historically, Lee has outlasted challenges to his leadership – including a prior schism in 2007 when another top figure (Ms. Kim, often called “Mother”) defected. Lee is no stranger to controversy, but he has maintained his position, and Shincheonji still sees significant growth (at least per their claims). It’s in this environment of near-deification of the founder that someone like Ko operated.

• “Mr. Ko” (Ko ____), Former General Affairs Chief: The man at the center of the scandal is known publicly only by his surname Ko (고). In Korea, it’s common for media to withhold full names of individuals not officially indicted, so he is called “고모 씨” – literally “Mr. Ko so-and-so.” Insiders, however, know who this is. Mr. Ko was one of Lee Man-hee’s closest aides. As General Affairs Director at Shincheonji’s headquarters, Ko had broad administrative control. Critically, when Lee was detained in 2020 on the COVID case, Ko stepped in to guide Shincheonjiv.daum.net. Many viewed him as effectively the vice-leader. Ko was reportedly in his 50s and had a reputation within Shincheonji – some ex-members describe him as having a forceful, authoritarian style. Starting around 2021, trouble began brewing for Ko due to his alleged misconduct (as detailed earlier: sexual assaults of female devotees and siphoning of funds). It appears there was an internal faction or individuals who wanted to hold Ko accountable – perhaps out of genuine concern or as part of a power struggle. By 2023, Ko was under huge pressure: whistleblowers like Mr. Yoo (the youth leader) were speaking out, and external anti-cult activists were targeting him. It’s in this climate that Ko’s desperation led to the alleged assault scheme – he wanted to silence whoever was “making trouble” for him. We do not know the exact identity of the member Ko wanted attacked; JTBC left that person unnamed (likely for safety). It could have been one of the whistleblowers (like Yoo) or someone internally who was spreading the word about Ko’s misdeeds. In any case, Ko crossing the line into planned violence shows the lengths he was willing to go to preserve his power. His subsequent expulsion in 2024 indicates that Lee Man-hee ultimately chose to scapegoat/remove Ko, possibly to save face for the church. This is a common pattern in such groups: when a scandal grows too big, the founder claims ignorance and sacrifices a lieutenant. Ko’s fate after expulsion is unclear – presumably he’s gone to ground. If the sexual assault allegations proceed legally, he could face prosecution; however, those cases often face challenges if victims are unwilling to testify (especially due to the alleged cover-up and intimidation). As of now, Ko has not publicly defended himself. It’s an open question whether Shincheonji loyalists consider him falsely accused or if they have accepted he was “fallen.” From a societal perspective, Ko is now seen as a prime example of Shincheonji’s abusive inner circle.

• The Targeted Whistleblower: Though unnamed, one must appreciate the courage and danger involved for the Shincheonji member who “raised issues” about Ko. In high-control groups like Shincheonji, dissent is rarely tolerated. Whistleblowers risk ostracism or worse. In this case, that person literally had a bounty put on them (Ko’s group was budgeting money to hire an attacker). It underscores the serious personal risk that ex-members or reformers face when challenging cult leadership. Fortunately, this person was not harmed and presumably has left Shincheonji or gone public via the victims’ networks. It also highlights why many Shincheonji victims only speak out anonymously or through organizations – the threat of retaliation can be very real.

The revelations in this news have several legal and social implications:

• Legal Accountability for Shincheonji’s Leadership: If indeed a leader of a religious organization conspired to commit assault, that is a criminal matter. South Korean authorities could potentially investigate Mr. Ko and any co-conspirators for incitement of violence, solicitation of a crime, etc. The obstacle is likely evidence – but JTBC’s material (texts, witness statements) could be shared with police. It’s possible this JTBC report might prompt authorities to open an inquiry. However, Shincheonji cases can be tricky; without an actual attack, prosecutors may be hesitant unless a whistleblower formally presses charges for the attempt/conspiracy. Still, the fact pattern is now public. At the very least, it adds to the pile of misconduct allegations against Shincheonji figures, possibly strengthening the resolve of law enforcement to keep an eye on the group.

• Protection of Cult Whistleblowers: This case shines a light on how dangerous it can be to speak up against a cult-like group. It may lead to calls for better protection of insiders who come forward. South Korea has seen similar situations with other cults – for example, victims of JMS (a Christian cult led by Jung Myung-seok) faced intimidation. After the Netflix documentary “In the Name of God: A Holy Betrayal” (March 2023) exposed JMS’s sexual abuses, there was increased public support for victims and condemnation of any retaliation. Now, with Shincheonji, advocacy groups like Jeonpiyeon might argue that authorities should proactively safeguard former members who testify, and perhaps even apply pressure on Shincheonji to renounce violent or unlawful enforcement of internal discipline.

• Public Perception and Policy: South Korea has a complicated relationship with new religious movements. On one hand, there is freedom of religion; on the other, groups deemed “heretical cults” (이단 사이비) by the Christian establishment often face public hostility. The Shincheonji COVID incident already swung public sentiment sharply against the group. These new reports of cultic violence and “above-the-law” behavior may further erode any remaining tolerance. It could influence public policy – for instance, could the government consider tighter regulations on religious organizations’ activities or finances? Already, after the COVID scandal, there were discussions about requiring groups to register members or cooperate more with health authoritiesforeignpolicy.com. We might see renewed calls in the National Assembly to scrutinize Shincheonji’s operations. However, any such moves must balance civil liberties. In the past, crackdowns (like Seoul City’s attempt to dissolve Shincheonji’s corporation) have met legal hurdlesbitterwinter.org. Another likely outcome is that mainline churches and cult-watching NGOs will intensify their monitoring of Shincheonji. Cases like this validate what critics have long said: that Shincheonji is not just theologically controversial, but engages in “anti-social” or illegal conduct.

• Shincheonji’s Internal Response: It’s also worth noting the internal implications. For Shincheonji members who remain, hearing that the former #2 plotted violence might be either disillusioning or dismissed as “worldly lies.” Shincheonji typically instructs members to avoid secular media, especially reports critical of the church. Hardcore believers might simply not believe JTBC (perhaps framing it as persecution). But those who harbored doubts about Ko might feel vindicated. The leadership, namely Lee Man-hee, will likely reassure members that Ko was a bad actor removed for his sins, thus attempting to preserve the image of the overall church. This is a classic damage-control strategy: “one rotten apple, now gone”. Whether members accept that or start questioning more of the church’s practices remains to be seen. Historically, Shincheonji has survived scandals by doubling down on teachings and insisting it’s the victim of Satan’s attacks whenever negative press emerges. Given that JTBC also reported on the illegal motorcade and other issues, Shincheonji may claim media persecution. Yet, these reports might sow seeds of doubt in some followers, potentially leading a few to leave the group, especially if more evidence surfaces.

• Broader Cult Crackdown Climate: South Korea in 2023–2025 has been in a bit of a “cult reckoning.” The JMS leader Jung Myung-seok was convicted and given a hefty prison sentence for raping female followers, and even his “Number 2” (a woman named Jeong Jo-eun) was arrested for abetting those crimesyoutube.com. Public awareness of cult abuse is high, thanks in part to documentaries and news coverage. JTBC’s investigation into Shincheonji comes in this context of increased scrutiny on fringe religious groups. Socially, there is more support now for clamping down on any religious group that violates the law or human rights. Shincheonji, which had somewhat receded from headlines after 2020, is now back in focus. This could result in joint efforts by civic groups and perhaps lawmakers to ensure incidents like the alleged assault plot are not tolerated. Already, the National Association of Cult Victims has been vocal; they might push for an investigation or at least publicize JTBC’s findings to warn people.

In essence, this news reaffirms the perception of Shincheonji as a secretive organization capable of extreme actions to protect itself. It serves as a cautionary tale and may have legal consequences if pursued. It also highlights the brave work of investigative journalists and ex-members in bringing such issues to light.

(Especially on Religious Cult Reporting)

JTBC (JoongAng Tongyang Broadcasting Company) is one of South Korea’s major broadcasters and has a strong reputation for credible journalism. In fact, JTBC is often regarded as one of the most trusted news sources in the country. For example, in a 2014 national survey of TV news credibility, JTBC ranked #1, with 27.9% of respondents naming it the most reliable – outperforming even long-established networks like KBS and MBCkoreatimes.co.kr. Similarly, media expert panels have praised JTBC: in 2015, a consortium of 500 journalism professionals awarded JTBC the “Best Reliability” honor for the second year running, citing its adherence to core journalistic valueskoreajoongangdaily.joins.com. These accolades reflect JTBC’s consistent track record of investigative and impactful reporting.

Several factors contribute to JTBC’s reputation:

• Investigative Journalism Pedigree: JTBC’s news division gained renown under anchor Sohn Suk-hee in the mid-2010s for fearless investigative pieces. The most famous was JTBC’s 2016 scoop of the “Choi Soon-sil tablet,” which exposed the influence-peddling scandal that led to President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. That story cemented JTBC’s image as a truth-seeking outlet unafraid to challenge those in power. This legacy carries into their current reporting. The Shincheonji series is an example – they invested time and resources to dig into an insular group, likely facing stonewalling and risk of lawsuits. It shows JTBC’s commitment to uncovering stories in the public interest, even if it means going up against powerful religious organizations or controversial figures.

• Fact-Checking and Quality: JTBC established a formal FactCheck team in 2014 (one of the first among Korean broadcasters) and has strived for accuracy. It often provides in-depth analysis rather than just superficial coverage. The reliability recognized by expertskoreajoongangdaily.joins.com indicates that JTBC is known for getting the story right and being careful with evidence. In the Shincheonji reports, we see that caution: they obtained hard proof (messages, videos) and multiple testimonies before broadcasting, and they gave Shincheonji a chance to comment (even if none was given)mk.co.kr. This journalistic rigor reduces the chance of error or slant.

• Neutral to Positive Perception: JTBC is not government-run (it’s affiliated with the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper, historically centrist to conservative, though JTBC’s TV news has a more independent streak). It doesn’t carry the partisan baggage that some older networks have. Many viewers, especially younger and moderate audiences, view JTBC as a fresh voice that isn’t afraid to criticize both the establishment and fringe elements. In recent years, some conservative critics allege JTBC has a liberal bias, but generally it’s respected for its professionalism. Notably, JTBC’s coverage of religious cults has been largely praised rather than seen as ideologically driven – exposing abuse transcends left/right politics.

• Experience in Cult Reporting: JTBC, like other mainstream media in Korea, has covered various religious scandals. For example, JTBC reported on the JMS cult case, giving updates on leader Jung Myung-seok’s trial and the brave testimonies of victims (one JTBC program even detailed how JMS’s #2 woman, Jeong Jo-eun, handpicked female devotees for him – contributing to public outrage)youtube.com. JTBC also covered the infamous Odaeyang mass suicide case and the Providence cult in past documentaries. In handling these topics, JTBC tends to collaborate with experts or feature interviews with ex-members, indicating they approach cult stories with seriousness and empathy for victims. In the Shincheonji context, this isn’t JTBC’s first encounter: back in 2020, JTBC was one of the key channels reporting on Shincheonji’s role in the COVID outbreak, and they did so rigorously (for instance, debunking rumors and focusing on verified facts during the panic). Their continued coverage in 2025 shows that they have sources and insight into Shincheonji. There is no evidence JTBC holds any animus toward Shincheonji beyond a journalistic duty to report its misdeeds. If anything, JTBC’s sustained investigation into Shincheonji indicates a level of reliability – they wouldn’t risk a defamation suit by a wealthy church without being confident in their information. (Shincheonji has been known to sue detractors; the fact that JTBC aired these exclusives means their legal team found the material solid.)

• Public Trust in Sensitive Reporting: When it comes to stories about religious organizations (which can be sensitive due to believers’ sentiments and libel laws), JTBC’s name generally assures viewers that the report is well-founded. Polls over the years (2014, 2017, etc.) have consistently put JTBC at or near the top in terms of public trust in newskoreatimes.co.kr. This public trust extends to their cult reporting. By contrast, some other outlets are owned by fundamentalist Christian interests (like CBS, the Christian Broadcasting System, which also reports on cults but from a particular religious perspective). JTBC is secular and independent, so its reports carry weight as coming from a general media standpoint, not an anti-cult ministry or a tabloid. For example, JTBC’s exclusive on Shincheonji’s illegal traffic control got picked up by other news outlets as straight factmk.co.krmk.co.kr – which shows peers trust their reporting.

In the specific case of Shincheonji, JTBC’s reporting appears thorough and fair. They label the piece “[단독]” (exclusive), indicating they broke this story. They included direct quotes and even blurred out specifics (like using “OOO” to redact certain names/groups in the texts)v.daum.net, likely to avoid harming unrelated parties or revealing sources. This careful approach bolsters their reliability. They also explicitly said they attempted to get Shincheonji’s sidev.daum.net – a hallmark of balanced reporting, even if the subject declines to comment.

JTBC’s reputation in South Korea is that of a top-tier news source known for credibility, depth, and impact. When it comes to reporting on controversial religious organizations such as Shincheonji, JTBC is generally seen as trustworthy and driven by journalistic concern (as opposed to rumor-mongering or religious bias). In fact, JTBC has won awards for its documentaries and news specials in these areaskoreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Their coverage often encourages public discourse and sometimes prompts action from authorities. Viewers tuning into this Shincheonji story on JTBC can be reasonably assured that the network has done its homework.

Of course, no outlet is infallible. JTBC, like others, has faced occasional criticisms or minor errors in the past. But in the grand scheme, it stands out in South Korea for maintaining high standards. This is why the user of this report can be confident that the content we summarized from JTBC is accurate and not sensationalized beyond the facts presented.

If the court determines that Shincheonji leadership—including Mr. Ko—conspired to commit assault, or used undocumented immigrants for criminal purposes, several serious criminal charges could apply under South Korean law:

1. Solicitation or Incitement of a Crime

Under the Korean Criminal Act (형법):

• Article 31 states that anyone who orders, incites, or instigates another person to commit a crime can be punished as a co-principal offender, even if they don’t physically participate.

• Even attempted incitement, if proven with evidence like messages and meetings, can lead to imprisonment, especially if the intended crime involves bodily harm or planned assault.

In this case, the court could charge Mr. Ko (and possibly complicit bodyguards) with conspiracy to commit assault and solicitation of violence—a felony offense.

2. Use of Illegal Foreign Labor in Criminal Activity

• Hiring undocumented immigrants for criminal purposes (even discussing it seriously) can fall under:

  • Violation of the Immigration Control Act

  • Criminal organization statutes if proven to be systemic

• If Ko intended to use this strategy to avoid traceability, it could also strengthen the prosecution’s argument of premeditation and malicious intent.

3. Organizational Responsibility (Institutional Liability)

• If Shincheonji is found to have covered up Ko’s behavior, or if the leadership was aware and complicit, then:

  • The entire religious corporation can be penalized under civil or administrative law.

  • Fines, dissolution of legal status, or asset seizure are possible.

• This happened in part during the COVID-19 case, where the Seoul City government revoked the church’s corporate registration in 2020 due to obstruction of epidemiological investigations.

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💥 How Serious Could It Be for Shincheonji?

▶ Short-Term Consequences

• Severe reputational damage, especially if this goes to trial.

• Increased scrutiny from media, watchdogs, and the government.

• Possibility of mass member departures if internal trust collapses.

• Additional lawsuits: victims or their families may now feel emboldened to sue for damages related to trauma, blackmail, or attempted coercion.

▶ Long-Term Impact

• Potential criminal conviction of top ex-leader = stain on Shincheonji’s claim to moral/spiritual authority.

• Loss of public legal protection, possibly leading to:

  • Deregistration of more Shincheonji branches or charities.

  • Refusal of permits for mass gatherings.

  • Blocking of overseas expansion or foreign missionary activities.

• Government monitoring or intervention in their operations, particularly if the group is deemed socially harmful.

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🛡️ How Shincheonji Might Respond – Damage Control Strategy

🧾 1. Public Denial Without Legal Risk

Shincheonji will likely issue a vague public statement such as:

“This incident involves a former member who is no longer affiliated with our church. His actions were not sanctioned by Shincheonji, and we deeply regret any misunderstanding or pain this may have caused.”

This type of non-committal response:

• Distances the organization from Ko without accepting responsibility.

• Avoids confirming any legal culpability (“alleged,” “individual action,” “not church doctrine”).

• Reinforces to members that this was a “bad apple,” not a reflection of Shincheonji as a whole.

🧑‍🎤 2. Control Internal Narrative (Spiritual Framing)

Internally, Shincheonji is likely to say something like:

“Just as Satan planted Judas among the disciples, even in the true church there may be wolves in sheep’s clothing. This is a test for the righteous.”

This tactic:

• Preserves the group’s spiritual legitimacy.

• Frames whistleblowers and media as persecutors.

• Reinforces loyalty by casting doubt on outsiders’ motives.

🔇 3. Silencing and Containment

• Evangelists and instructors will be instructed not to discuss the incident with newcomers.

• Students will be discouraged from researching online—labeling all coverage as “spiritual poison” or “fake news.”

• Some members may be privately told that JTBC is biased or part of a conspiracy to destroy God’s chosen people.

📑 4. Reframe the Incident as Persecution

Just like in the COVID case, Shincheonji could spin the situation as:

“They hate us because we have the truth. Just as Jesus was falsely accused, we too are under attack. But God’s work will not be stopped.”

This martyr complex is a powerful tool to increase loyalty, especially among already-devoted members.

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🔍 Comparisons to Other Cult or High-Control Group Cases

Common pattern in all cases:

• Initial denial

• Blame on outsiders or rogue individuals

• Refusal to accept systemic fault

• Attempt to shield leader from legal consequences

• Use of religious language to galvanize members

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🔍 What Would a Typical Organization Do to “Save Face”?

To avoid reputational ruin or legal backlash, a group like Shincheonji may:

1. Expel the scapegoat (already done)

   “We have removed the individual responsible for these alleged actions.”

2. Reaffirm the moral authority of the founder (Lee Man-hee)

   “Our Chairman has always upheld righteousness.”

3. Avoid litigation risk by not officially responding to the details in public.
   No names, no confirmations = less risk of defamation countersuits.

4. Privately reassure members that the media is exaggerating or lying.
   Media = Babylon / worldly interference.

5. Focus on charitable acts or mass events (plasma donations, 100K graduations) to distract from scandals.

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🔚 Conclusion: What This Means for Shincheonji

This scandal could be one of the most damaging incidents since the COVID-19 outbreak, depending on legal follow-up. However, Shincheonji is highly media-trained, and its leadership knows how to minimize fallout:

• They’ll likely deny official involvement, cast Ko as a renegade, and spiritually reframe the crisis to deflect accountability.

• Legally, they may cooperate partially, but only when pressured, and they will aim to avoid institutional charges.

The key will be whether:

• Victims press charges

• The public demands accountability

• Authorities open a formal investigation

Until then, expect Shincheonji to deny, deflect, and delay—all while working hard to make the scandal disappear from public memory.

• JTBC News (Korean) – “‘Use an illegal immigrant to fix him’… Shincheonji #2 orders assault on follower”v.daum.netv.daum.netv.daum.net.

• JTBC News (Korean) – “‘Lee Man-hee’s car must not stop’ – Illegal traffic control like a president”v.daum.netv.daum.net.

• NoCut News (Christian media) – “Shincheonji high-ranking official sexual assault allegations… organized cover-up”mch.nocutnews.co.krmch.nocutnews.co.kr.

• Reuters – “S.Korea sect leader acquitted on virus obstruction, convicted of embezzlement”reuters.comreuters.com.

• Donga Ilbo – Photo of Shincheonji 100,000 graduation ceremony at Daegu Stadium (Nov 2023)donga.com.

• Korea Times – “News viewers trust JTBC most” (2014 survey)koreatimes.co.kr.

• Korea JoongAng Daily – “JTBC recognized for reliability by media awards” (2015)koreajoongangdaily.joins.com.